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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GARYD. HILFIKER, JR., 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
SCOTT CARVER, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Priority No. 3 
Case No. 960397-CA 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
This is Hilfiker's appeal from the trial court's denial of his request for 
post-conviction relief. The petition challenges his conviction on the grounds that 
his attorney was constitutionally ineffective. The supreme court transferred this 
appeal under its pour-over authority, giving this Court jurisdiction. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Has Hilfiker overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's 
representation was that of a reasonably prudent attorney, within the "wide range 
of professional assistance?" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984); State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah App. 1995). 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny post-conviction relief, this 
Court will overturn incorrect legal conclusions without hesitation, but will set 
aside "underlying factual findings" only if they are clearly erroneous. Fernandez 
v. Cooky 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993). As the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained in Parts andElec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec, 866 F.2d 
228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988), "to be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as 
more than just maybe or probably wrong, it must. . . strike us as wrong with the 
force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish." 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Any relevant statutes or rules are included in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
For stabbing his girlfriend in the head 11 times and setting her on fire with 
lamp oil, a jury convicted Hilfiker of criminal homicide and aggravated arson on 
April 27, 1992 (Crim.R. 444; PCR. 60).1 Consequently, the criminal trial court 
1
 Facts regarding the crime are also taken from the transcripts of the criminal 
trial, which are part of the record in this case. Because this case involves the record from two 
separate proceedings, Hilfiker's criminal trial and his post-conviction trial, the different 
records will be cited as follows: the criminal trial court's record and the criminal trial 
transcripts will be referred to as (Crim.R. __); the post-conviction record and transcript will be 
referred to as (PCR. ). 
2 
sentenced defendant to two five-to-life terms at the Utah State Prison (igL). 
Through the Salt Lake Legal Defenders' office, Hilfiker appealed his conviction 
to this Court, claiming that the criminal trial court should have suppressed his 
confession; this Court disagreed and affirmed. State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826 
(Utah App. 1994). 
Six months later, Hilfiker filed this petition for post-conviction relief, 
alleging that his defense attorney at the criminal trial, Candice Johnson, was 
constitutionally ineffective (PCR. 1-4). The trial court held an evidentiary 
hearing where it heard from Hilfiker, Ms. Johnson, Greg Bown, who prosecuted 
the criminal case, and two witnesses called by Hilfiker: Doris Childs and Teresa 
Hilfiker (PCR. 104; 215; 223) After hearing evidence, the court rejected 
Hilfiker's ineffectiveness claim, denied the requested relief, and dismissed the 
petition (PCR. 74). 
Statement of Facts 
THE EVIDENCE AT THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 
A few hours after the victim was found at the burned home, Hilfiker 
confessed (Crim.R. 724-25).2 Detective James Alcock, who questioned Hilfiker 
2
 Hilfiker's confession was taped and then transcribed. The State introduced the 
transcription as exhibit 37, part of the record on this appeal. 
3 
during his confession, read it into the record during the trial and the jury also was 
able to read the transcript as an exhibit (id.). Hilfiker admitted that after drinking 
alcohol and snorting about a quarter gram of cocaine, he returned to the home he 
was sharing with the victim, Marsha Haverty (Crim.R. 726). Ms. Haverty woke 
up when he entered and became upset upon learning he was high on cocaine 
(MJ. 
Depressed about other matters, including his unrequited love for a previous 
girlfriend and his fear that Ms. Haverty was getting too serious, Hilfiker walked 
into the kitchen and got a knife with which he threatened to commit suicide 
(Crim.R. 727). Ms. Haverty tried to console him and give him a hug, but 
Hilfiker pushed her away, causing her to fall on her back and hurt herself (id.). 
Hilfiker stabbed her next to the left eye socket and then, reads the confession, 
"everything was a blur" (id.). The next thing he clearly remembered was pulling 
the knife out and seeing blood everywhere (kL). In the confession, Hilfiker says: 
"I must have stabbed her. I was the only one in the house. I am not sure how 
many times. It is a blur. I don't remember" (Exhibit 37 at 2). 
Hilfiker did remember taking an afghan off a couch, placing it on Ms. 
Haverty, pouring lamp oil over it, and setting it afire with a Bic lighter (Crim.R. 
728-29). Then, his memory again became blurry and he vaguely recalled getting 
4 
in his car, driving down 7th East and around town before he returned to the 
Haverty home, where he pretended distress to the firefighters and police (R. 730-
33). Suspicious because of inconsistencies in his story and blood on his hands 
and clothing, the police eventually took Hilfiker in for questioning where he 
finally confessed (Crim.R. 732-734).3 
Because defendant confessed to murdering Ms. Haverty, defense counsel 
took issue only with defendant's intent (Crim.R. 456). Her goal was to convince 
the jury to convict of manslaughter rather than criminal homicide (PCR. 180). 
To that end, she called a forensic toxicologist, Dr. Bryan Finkle, who testified 
that the combined effect of alcohol and cocaine would be like driving with one 
foot on the gas pedal and one on the brake, and a psychologist, Dr. Linda 
Gummow, who testified about Hilfiker's mental state (Crim.R. 817; 892). Dr. 
Gurnmow stated that Hilfiker had long-standing emotional problems and used 
drugs and alcohol abusively (Crim.R. 907-908). Due to the mixture of alcohol 
and cocaine, according to Dr. Gummow, Hilfiker was "extremely emotionally 
distraught and out of control" the night of the crime, making it unlikely that he 
deliberately killed the victim (Crim.R. 920). Rather, she opined, he committed 
3
 Defense counsel moved to suppress the confession but the trial court denied the 
request. On direct appeal, this Court upheld the confession's admissibility. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 
at 828. 
5 
the murder "recklessly and secondary to an emotional disturbance that was 
exacerbated by drug use" (id.). 
Judy Aldous, Hilfiker's former girlfriend, told the jury she had spoken 
with him shortly before Ms. Haverty's murder and she believed "everything was 
building up on him" (Crim.R. 888). His manager at the Ute Cab company, 
David Noker, stated that Hilfiker came to him late on the night before the crime; 
he told Noker he was "scared," but did not say why (Crim.R. 877). Hilfiker's 
drinking companions the night of the crime saw him consume at least five 
alcoholic beverages, including whiskey with coca-cola, whiskey straight, and 
tequila straight, and snort about three lines of cocaine (Crim.R. 860; 868). It 
was shortly after this that he returned to Ms. Haverty's home for the last time. 
EVIDENCE FROM THE POST-CONVICTION HEARING 
On the stand, Hilfiker admitted that trial counsel met with him close to ten 
times to discuss strategy and evidence (PCR. 107; see also Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A)). During these discussions, she 
told him about the maximum potential penalties, but Ms. Johnson did not recall 
whether she specifically discussed the potential for consecutive sentences (PCR. 
63). Also, Ms. Johnson informed Hilfiker of the State's plea bargain offer, i.e., 
dropping the aggravated arson charge for a plea of guilt to the homicide charge 
6 
(PCR. 62). At one point, Hilfiker wanted to take the bargain; however, because 
he was in tears and obviously upset, trial counsel told him to calm down and 
think it through before making a final decision (i$L). Eventually, after thinking 
through the options, Hilfiker sent a letter to trial counsel thanking her for her 
"swell job" and telling her he would not accept a plea bargain unless it was a 
"gift horse" (i<L). 
Either trial counsel or her investigator interviewed all the witnesses 
Hilfiker requested, including Doris Childs and Teresa Hilfiker, who took the 
stand at the post-conviction hearing (PCR. 64-65). Called as Hilfiker's witness at 
the post-conviction hearing, Ms.Childs lived with Hilfiker from November 1986 
to April 1987 (id.V Although she stated Hilfiker was never abusive toward her, 
she was not aware of his 1991 domestic violence assault charge and agreed that 
she was not familiar with his propensity for violence as of 1992 (isL). Ms. 
Hilfiker was married to petitioner for three years in the mid-1980s (id.). Like 
Ms. Childs, Ms. Hilfiker experienced no abuse during their relationship though 
she too was unaware of the 1991 domestic violence charge and her ex-husband's 
propensity for violence as of 1992 (PCR. 66). 
At trial counsel's request, the criminal trial court instructed the jury on the 
lesser included offenses of manslaughter, tampering with evidence, and 
7 
abuse/desecration of a dead body (PCR. 67). Further, the instructions contained 
a charge that voluntary intoxication was a defense if it negated the mental state 
required to commit the offense (id*). Despite these instructions, the jury 
convicted Hilfiker of criminal homicide and aggravated arson, the original, 
charged offenses. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence from Hilfiker's criminal trial and post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing show that his trial counsel acted in a reasonably prudent fashion 
throughout her representation. On post-conviction review, Hilfiker lays out five 
predicate claims as examples of his counsel's insufficient performance. Because 
trial counsel did not actually act inadequately with regard to any of these claims, 
Hilfiker's overall claim of ineffectiveness lacks merit. 
Hilfiker fails to marshal any evidence regarding his first challenge, i.e., to 
his trial counsel's purportedly eliciting negative or inconsistent information from 
witnesses either on cross-examination or direct. Except for one witness, Floyd 
Pitt, Hilfiker does not name any person who actually testified inconsistently at 
trial nor does he set forth that witness' alleged inconsistency. Hilfiker's failure to 
establish these basic facts essentially asks this Court to dig through the lengthy 
record. Except in capital cases, this lourt is not required to do this job for the 
8 
appellant and should not do so here. On that basis alone, Hilfiker's first 
predicate claim should be discarded. In any event, the actual "inconsistencies," 
if they can be called that, in Mr. Pitts' trial testimony versus his trial statements 
to the police are so inconsequential they would have had no effect on the jury's 
deliberations even if they had been brought out by trial counsel. 
Trial counsel also acted in a reasonably prudent manner in her choice not 
to call Hilfiker or two of his requested witnesses, Doris Childs and Teresa 
Hilfiker, to the stand. Hilfiker was too emotional, trial counsel recalled, to be 
trusted to be a good witness for himself. Ms. Childs and Ms. Hilfiker did not 
have any information significant to the issues in the trial because their 
involvement with Hilfiker ended in the mid-1980s. Further, at the post-
conviction hearing, both of these women spoke of Hilfiker's "peaceful" 
disposition. Had this information come before the jury, the State could have 
brought in evidence of his prior conviction for domestic violence and other bad 
acts. 
The post-conviction court also properly rejected Hilfiker's claim that trial 
counsel did not advise him that the criminal court could, as it eventually did, 
sentence him to two consecutive terms. The post-conviction court found that 
both trial counsel and the court had told Hilfiker of the maximum potential 
9 
sentences, even though trial counsel might not ha' specifically mentioned 
consecutive sentences. Thus, Hilfiker had sufficier information to refuse the 
offered plea bargain. In any event, post-convictior lelief is not available when 
the claim is a missed opportunity to plea bargain. 
Hilfiker's claim that witness Judy Aldous, during cross-examination, 
implied that he had been sent to jail for domestic violence is also off the mark. 
Hilfiker admitted during the post-conviction hearing that Ms. Aldous never used 
the word jail in his post-conviction testimony. Further, given the context of her 
admission that Hilfiker had physically abused her and voluntarily sought help, 
trial counsel might have reasonably believed the testimony helped further her 
overall trial strategy. 
Contrary to Hilfiker's post-conviction allegation, the prosecutor's use of a 
styrofoam head was not outside the boundary of permissible conduct courts give 
attorneys during closing argument, i.e., to comment on the evidence and 
reasonable inferences and deductions. Neither trial counsel nor the court recalled 
anything objectionable about the demonstration. Consequently, counsel's 
decision not to object was reasonable and prudent. 
Finally, Hilfiker mistakenly complains that trial counsel did not use 
"diminished capacity" as a defense. The record shows that although trial counsel 
10 
may not have used that term, her strategy revolved around the concept. Through 
testimony of a toxicologist and a psychologist, trial counsel tried to negate the 
levels of intent necessary for the jury to find criminal homicide and aggravated 
arson. This is a diminished capacity defense and trial counsel implemented it 
carefully. 
ARGUMENT 
NONE OF fflLFIKER'S GRIEVANCES ABOUT TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION ARISE FROM 
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE; 
THEREFORE, HE CANNOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL. 
In his brief, Hilfiker alleges five instances of deficient performance in trial 
counsel's conduct. He argues that these events meet both prongs of the test of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), which requires that trial 
counsel's performance fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that 
the unreasonable performance prejudice the case. Deciding the ultimate question 
of counsel's effectiveness turns on the substantive, individual challenges Hilfiker 
makes: what might be called his predicate claims. 
Obviously, if trial counsel made the right decisions regarding those claims, 
her representation met sixth amendment mandates. However, even if counsel's 
decisions were not the "right" decisions in retrospect, her representation will not 
11 
be considered below those mandates unless they cannot be considered "legitimate 
strategic choices." State v. Tennyson, 8C0 P.2C ^ol, 465-66 (Utah App. 1993). 
Recognizing that a trial is a difficult, tense, and constantly-changing 
environment, courts give trial counsel wide latitude to develop and present cases, 
and, therefore, impose a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 
the wide range of professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 689; Tennyson, 
850 P.2d at 465. Similarly, "acts or omissions [that] might be considered sound 
trial strategy" are immunized from attack. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 
(Utah 1993). 
I. Hilfiker does not state what testimony his counsel elicited 
from defense witnesses that conflicted with previous 
statements or his confession; therefore, this Court cannot 
meaningfully review the challenge and it cannot serve as a 
predicate to an ineffective assistance claim. 
The first complaint with trial counsel's work is that she obtained testimony 
from witnesses that either conflicted with previous statements or contradicted 
Hilfiker's confession. Brief of Petitioner at 7. The unstated corollary of this 
claim is that these discrepancies harmed Hilfiker's case. However, except for 
Floyd Pitts, a witness for the State, Hilfiker fails to present the discrepancies or 
name the witnesses whose testimonies conflicted with the alleged previous 
statements or the confession. Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate the 
12 
substance of Hilfiker's claim except for his assertion that Pitts' testimony 
contradicted itself and "changed many times." Brief of Petitioner at 7. 
Here even, Hilfiker does not explain what particular parts of Pitts' 
testimony changed, preventing this Court from conducting any meaningful 
review. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993) (marshaling 
provides basis "from which [appellate court can] conduct a meaningful and 
expedient review of facts challenged on appeal."). What is remarkable about 
Hilfiker's failure to marshal is not that he just fails to compile the evidence in 
support of the trial court!s findings, but mat he fails to compile any evidence at 
all. This complete failure asks the Court to speculate about the evidence and dig 
through the transcripts on its own. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988) (holding that reviewing court is not a "depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research"). 
Because Hilfiker has failed to present any evidence supporting his 
assertions in compliance with marshaling, this Court should refuse to examine the 
claim on the merits. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992). 
13 
Being thus precluded from review on the merits of this predicate claim, Hilfiker 
cannot use this charge as foundation for his ineffectiveness challenge.4 
II. Trial counsels decision not to call Hilfiker to 
the stand and her decision not to call Doris 
Childs, Teresa Hilfiker, or Dr. Craig Hyatt 
was within the wide range of permissible 
discretion courts grant defense counsel in 
deciding how to implement trial strategy. 
As the post-conviction court stated in its findings, trial counsel called six 
witnesses on Hilfiker's behalf, including two experts, a toxicologist and 
psychologist (PCR. 69-71; Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order 
(Addendum A)). These witnesses stated their observations of Hilfiker's behavior 
the night of the crime, his alcohol and cocaine intoxication, and his evident stress 
(See Statement of Facts at 6-7). With this evidence, trial counsel showed the jury 
a person who was intoxicated, mentally unstable, and extremely emotional. The 
goal was to convince the jury that, in the words of Dr. Gummow, the murder of 
Marsha Haverty was reckless and not deliberate, that Hilfiker was incapable of 
4
 Even were this Court to ignore Hilfiker's failure to marshal any evidence, the 
post-conviction evidentiary transcript shows that the claimed inconsistencies are 
inconsequential and could not have had any effect on the resulting verdict. The 
"inconsistencies'' included whether Mr. Pitts did or did not follow Ms. Haverty home the 
night of the crime and the amount of time Mr. Pitts knew Hilfiker (PCR. 138-39). Neither of 
these issues pertain to any of the issues in the criminal trial, i.e., Hilfiker's mental state when 
he committed the crime. The State called Pitts merely to identify a jacket found at the burning 
home as one he had seen Hilfiker previously wear (Crim.R. 530). 
14 
forming a deliberate intent due to his intoxication (Crim.R. 920; PCR. 67; 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A)). 
The failure to reach this goal is not a legitimate criticism of trial counsel's 
attempts at it. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) ("failure to 
produce expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel"). Yet, 
Hilfiker claims that the addition of his testimony along with three other witnesses 
would have brought about his expected result. Brief of Petitioner at 8. 
However, he does not say what this testimony would have been other than that it 
would have "humanized'' him and "mitigated'' his crime. Id. This again asks 
the trial court to do the research and investigation that is Hilfiker's job to do. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450. 
In any event, Hilfiker's assertion that the jury was entitled to hear 
"mitigating" evidence is legally wrong. Brief of Petitioner at 8. In capital cases, 
the jury has a sentencing function and a part of the trial is dedicated to establish 
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances so that the jury can decide the 
appropriate sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1995). Juries in non-capital 
cases do not play this role. In fact, the jury here was given an explicit instruction 
that prohibited it from considering the sentence in its guilt vs. innocence 
determination (Crim.R. 136). 
15 
Additionally, trial counsel had legitimate reasons not to call Hilfiker to the 
stand. Not only was he very emotional, leading her to fear he might hurt his 
case, but he also had no other information to give the jury (PCR. 71, Findings of 
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A); 204-06). Trial counsel 
stated her reasons for recommending against testifying in the post-conviction 
hearing. 
I felt that Gary [Hilfiker] at that time could not help his 
case anymore and might hurt his case given his ~ his 
feelings about his response during the course of trial. It 
was an upsetting situation for him. He had nothing 
further to tell the jury that I could imagine. He had to 
undergo cross-examination from Mr. Bown. Under 
cross-examination, there is always a chance that things 
can go wrong for someone. And it was my decision that 
basically we had everything that we needed. I would 
only recommend that a defendant take the stand if it was 
absolutely critical to the defense, there was no 
additional information that could be offered or if the 
Defendant absolutely insisted on taking the stand. And 
if the defendant insisted on taking the stand, I would put 
him on the stand. He did not. 
(PCR. 187). 
Trial counsel was aware of Ms. Children' and Ms. Hilfiker's potential 
testimony, which when brought forth at the post-conviction hearing consisted of 
their remembrances of Hilfiker from the early-to-mid-1980s as a non-violent 
person (PCR. 216-28). Ms. Children lived with Hilfiker for approximately six 
16 
months; Ms. Hilfiker was married to him for three years (id.). Trial counsel's 
decision not to place these women on the stand was legitimate and reasonable. 
As the post-conviction court concluded, had any witness "opened the door" by 
referring to Hilfiker's peacefulness, the State could have introduced his prior 
conviction and other "bad acts" (PCR. 71; Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law 
and Order (Addendum A)). 
Further, neither witness, according to trial counsel, had significant other 
information to disclose that would have been helpful to the case (PCR. 174-76). 
Under these circumstances, the decision not to call either Ms. Children or Ms. 
Hilfiker was reasonable. See State v. Huggins, 294 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 
App. filed July 1996) (where suggested witnesses would not have contributed 
significant information and could have opened the door to prior convictions, trial 
counsel's decision not to call them was appropriate). Trial counsel's choice of 
witnesses was one any reasonably prudent attorney would have taken. It was 
designed to persuade the jury to convict of lesser-included offenses and minimize 
potential damage to the overall case (PCR. 67 (Findings of Fact Conclusions of 
Law and Order (Addendum A)). 
17 
HI. Trial counsel gave Hilfiker sufficient information for 
him to make a proper decision about the plea 
bargain, which, in any event, is not a legitimate basis 
for post-conviction relief; therefore, trial counsel did 
not perform inadequately. 
Before the criminal trial, the State offered Hilfiker a plea agreement that 
would require him to plead guilty to the homicide charge in exchange for 
dismissal of the aggravated arson charge (PCR. 62, Findings of Fact Conclusions 
of Law and Order (Addendum A)). At one point, Hilfiker told trial counsel he 
wanted to accept the offer but, because he was very emotional then, she asked 
him to wait before making a decision (id.). 
Eventually Hilfiker told trial counsel, via a letter he sent through Doris 
Children, that he would not accept a plea bargain unless it was a "gift horse" 
(PCR. 63). On post-conviction review, the trial court construed this statement as 
indicating that Hilfiker would plead only to a lesser-included offense, such as 
manslaughter and would no longer accept the State's offer (id.). Hilfiker now 
claims trial counsel did not let him know that, if he went to trial and was 
convicted of both first-degree felonies, he could be sentenced consecutively. 
Brief of Defendant at 9. Thus, asserts Hilfiker, he was inadequately advised 
about the risks of refusing the bargain. 
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After the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court 
rejected this allegation, finding that trial counsel and the criminal trial court had 
discussed the maximum penalties for each offense with Hilfiker (PCR. 69, 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A)). Thus, although 
trial counsel might not have specifically mentioned the possibility of consecutive 
sentences, Hilfiker had enough information to make an informed refusal of the 
State's offer (id.). Hilfiker again does not marshal the evidence in support of this 
finding. Therefore, this Court assumes it is adequately supported by the record 
and proceeds to the resulting legal conclusion. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 
818, 820 (Utah App. 1992). The post-conviction court ruled that counsel's 
representation was within the wide range of professional assistance and, thus, not 
grounds for an ineffectiveness claim (PCR. 72, Findings of Fact Conclusions of 
Law and Order (Addendum A)). 
This ruling is correct. "[The] state and federal constitutions guarantee fair 
trials, not plea bargains." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987) 
(citing State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). Therefore, even if trial 
counsel's representations to Hilfiker regarding the plea were open to question, 
post-conviction relief simply is not available to remedy a criminal defendant's 
failure to accept a plea bargain. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 515, 519 (Utah 
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159-1) (habeas relief available where defendant has suffered a "substantial and 
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right:); Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 
991 (Utah 1993) (relief via post-conviction available only to remedy "substantial 
denial of a constitutional right"). 
IV. Contrary to Hilfiker's assertion, Judy Aldous did not 
imply that he went to jail for abusing her or was ever 
convicted for domestic violence; in any event, 
information that he voluntarily sought help for this 
problem was harmless error, if error at all. 
Hilfiker argues that, on cross-examination, Judy Aldous implied that he 
was sent to jail because of physical abuse. Brief of Defendant at 9. Trial counsel 
called Ms. Aldous to testify to the stress Hilfiker was experiencing the days 
before the murder (Crim.R. 888). During cross-examination, the prosecutor 
asked Ms. Aldous if Hilfiker had ever physically abused her (id.). She admitted 
abuse but also stated that Hilfiker recognized the problem and voluntarily called 
the police and "asked for help" (Crim.R. 890). Contrary to Hilfiker's current 
claim, Ms. Aldous never stated he was sent to jail or convicted for domestic 
violence; indeed, Hilfiker admitted this at the evidentiary hearing (PCR. 156). 
Ms. Aldous' statements provide no reasonable grounds for Hilfiker's 
assertion *hat they implied he was jailed or convicted. They do not conflict with 
Ae ^irs-ik/J order suppressing HiL.cer's prior convictions (Crim.R. 69-70). 
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Also, given that Ms. Aldous provided evidence of a repentant Hilfiker, trying to 
control his emotions and violence, a reasonably prudent attorney may have 
decided not to object on the reasonable belief that it would help her overall theory 
of no deliberate intent. State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995) 
(depending on circumstances, refusing to object may be a legitimate trial 
strategy). 
In any event, this testimony did not prejudice Hilfiker's case. To show 
this, Hilfiker would need establish a reasonable possibility that, but for the 
evidence, the outcome of the trial would have ended more favorably, i.e., in a 
verdict for lesser-included offenses. Hug gins, 294 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. On 
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balance with the rest of the evidence, the information Ms. Aldous gave the jury 
was not of such significance that it alone would have swayed the jury's vote. 
Therefore, neither Ms. Aldous' testimony nor trial counsel's decision not to 
object to it was ineffective. 
V. The prosecutor's use of the styrofoam head during 
closing argument was not out-of-line to such an 
extent that trial counsel was constitutionally 
obligated to object. 
In his transcribed confession, admitted at the trial and read into evidence, 
Hilfiker claimed he had cut his hand on the window while trying to get into the 
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burning home (Exhibit 37 at 13). During closing argument, the prosecutor 
attacked this claim, using a styrofoam model head to show the jury how the 
cutting could have happened and the force required to do so (Crim. R. 660-61). 
From the prosecutor's remarks, his display was intended to show that Hilfiker 
had used deliberate rather than reckless action. 
Showing you this Styrofoam head, showing you the 
murder weapon. How could he cut his hand? Well, 
blood's all over the place; blood's slippery. It is on the 
handle. We know his blood is on the handle, and her 
blood is all over the place....There is this z-shaped 
wound where a chip of blood — a chip of bone was 
actually taken from the skull. What would happen if 
there is a blow and it chips? It stops in the bone. It 
chips and stops. What happens with a slippery object 
(Indicating)? It cuts your hand. That's how it 
happened. 
Id. 
Neither trial counsel nor the court intervened (R. 72). The demonstration 
appears to have been reasonably based on the "evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 
1989) (holding that counsel have wide latitude in closing arguments to discuss 
evidence). During the post-conviction hearing, Hilfiker and his two witnesses, 
Doris Children and Teresa Hilfiker, stated the jury appeared to be "shocked" by 
the display (PCR. 71; Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order 
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(Addendum A)). Nevertheless, the post-conviction court was within its discretion 
to believe instead the testimony of the criminal trial counsel who found nothing 
objectionable (PCR. 208; PCR. 72 (Addendum A)). Trial counsel's decision not 
to object to the closing argument was a reasonably prudent one (id.). 
VI. Hilfiker's complaint that trial counsel did not present 
evidence of "diminished capacity" should be rejected 
because it is factually incorrect; Hilfiker's alleged 
inability to form a deliberate intent due to 
intoxication was the centerpiece of trial counsel's 
strategy and it was well implemented. 
Because his confession severely limited trial counsel's options, her defense 
of Hilfiker rested on persuading the jury that his intoxication negated his ability 
to form the intentional or knowing "intent" needed to establish criminal 
homicide (PCR. 191; 67, Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order). This 
is a "diminished capacity" defense. "Appropriate testimony showing that 
defendant's intoxication negated the existence of the mental state which is an 
element of the offense would be a form of evidence bearing on diminished mental 
capacity." State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 857 n.24 (Utah App. 1992). 
Though trial counsel did not use the term "diminished capacity," that concept 
was the keystone of her strategy and she implemented it with the testimony of Dr. 
Gummow, Dr. Finkle and the non-expert witnesses who testified to Hilfiker's 
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heavy use of alcohol and cocaine. Hilfiker was in total agreement with this 
strategy (PCR. 68, Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order). 
Dr. Gummow stated that due to the combined use of alcohol and cocaine, 
together with his general emotional state, she did not believe Hilfiker could have 
killed the victim deliberately (Crim.R. 920). Trial counsel argued Hilfiker's 
mental state extensively in closing, commenting on his intoxication and his 
general emotional state as well as on Dr. Gummow's testimony (Crim.R. 1019-
1021).5 Trial counsel also requested and received an instruction on voluntary 
intoxication and "extreme emotional disturbance,'' along with the lesser-included 
offense instructions, which she also argued at closing (Crim.R. 1024; PCR. 131). 
Trial counsel relied on Hilfiker's intoxication to negate the necessary intent for 
both crimes. Just because the defense was not successful does not render trial 
counsel ineffective. 
5
 Hilfiker cites to two letters in his "supplemental record" from Dr. Gummow 
that indicate trial counsel did not use evidence of "diminished capacity." These letters are not 
appropriately part of the record. On April 12, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court ordered the 
district court clerk to supplement the post-conviction record with the criminal trial record 
(attached as Addendum B). This is the only supplementation order in this case. Dr. 
Gummow's letters were not before the criminal court or the post-conviction court. Therefore, 
pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, these letters, and all Hilfiker's 
purported "supplemental record" should be stricken. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Gummow's letters are not significant. Given the evidence and 
argument trial counsel actually used at trial, Dr. Gummow simply seems confused about the 
various ways the concept "diminished capacity" can be used without ever using the term. 
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None of Hilfiker's grievances rise to the level of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Because of the confession and the nature of the crime, trial counsel's 
options were limited to persuading the jury to accept lesser-included offenses 
(PCR. 67, Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order). Trial counsel 
discussed this strategy with Hilfiker who "supported it enthusiastically until it 
produced an unfavorable verdict." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 76 (Utah App. 
1990). Hilfiker cannot establish deficient performance in any aspect of trial 
counsel's representation. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the post-conviction court's denial of Hilfiker's 
requested relief and the dismissal of his petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J^dJd&y of September 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY D. HILFIKER, JR., 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 940903984 HC 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court on June 21-
22, 1995 for an evidentiary hearing on the petition for 
extraordinary re'iief pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Petitioner was present and was represented by Dean C. 
Andreasen. Respondent was represented by Angela F. Micklos and 
David E. Yocom, Assistant Attorneys General. After reviewing the 
file in this matter and in the underlying criminal matcer, and 
.WW 
after hearing oral testimony and counselfs arguments, the Court now 
enters the following. 
riNPINOS l>r FACT 
1. On April 27, 1992, petitioner was charged by information 
with criminal homicide, a first degree felony, and aggravated 
arson, a first degree felony. After a jury trial on November 10-
14, 1992, petitioner was convicted of both counts. On December 14, 
1992, the trial court sentenced petitioner to serve five-years-to-
life on each count, to run consecutively. 
2. On April 29, 1992, Candice Johnson entered her appearance 
of counsel and a request for discovery on petitioner's behalf. 
3. Ms. Johnson m£t often with petitioner in the jail from 
May 1992 until the time of trial in November 1992. During one of 
Ms. Johnson's visits with petitioner at the jail prior to the 
preliminary hearing, Ms. Johnson discussed with petitioner a 
possible plea agreement that they could seek from the prosecutor. 
Ms. Johnson told petitioner that they could request a plea 
agreement which would allow petitioner to plead to manslaughter, a 
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second degree felony, and destruction of evidence, a third degree 
felony. 
4. The only plea agreement offered by the prosecutor 
provided that the aggravated arson charge would be dismissed if 
petitioner pled to the first degree murder count as charged. Ms. 
Johnson discussed the plea agreement with petitioner. Petitioner 
was very upset and stated that he just wanted to plead and get 
things over with. Ms. Johnson testified that she would never allow 
a client to plead guilty in such a distraught state of mind and, 
that therefore, she advised petitioner to think it over and told 
petitioner that she would discuss the matter with him again when he 
was thinking more clearly. 
5. Ms. Johnson's advice to petitioner to postpone deciding 
whether he wanted to plead guilty until he was thinking more 
clearly was sound and rational. 
6. During her discussions with petitioner regarding the plea 
agreement, Ms. Johnson informed petitioner that he would be 
pleading to a first degree felony which carried a penalty of five-
years- to-life at the prison. Ms. Johnson also informed petitioner 
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that she would try to get second and third degree convictions at 
trial, which would carry a 1-15 year and 0-5 year penalty, 
respectively. Ms. Johnsou has no specific memory of discussing the 
possibility of consecutive sentences, but she did discuss the 
maximum penalties for each offense. Ms. Johnson told petitioner 
that he would definitely go to prison and that the only issue was 
for how long. 
7• Petitioner made the ultimate decision whether to accept 
the plea agreement or to proceed to tri^l. Ms. Johnson did not 
coerce petitioner into going to trial. 
8. On October 14, 1992, petitioner sent Ms. Johnson a letter 
thanking her for the "swell job" that she was doing and stating 
that he would not accept a plea agreement unless it was a "gift 
horse." The rational implication of petitioner's statement is that 
he would only accept a plea bargain to manslaughter or another 
lesser offense. 
9. On December 15, 1992, petitioner, through his friend, 
Doris Childs, sent Ms. Johnson a card thanking her for all that she 
had done on petitioner's behalf. 
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10. Prior to petitioner's decision to proceed to trial, Ms. 
Johnson received all discoverable information from the prosecutor's 
file and personally viewed all of the physical evidence with the 
prosecutor, Greg Bown. 
11. To the best of her knowledge, Ms. Johnson, either 
personally or through her investigator, Dennis Couch, spoke to all 
of the potential witnesses that petitioner asked her to contact. 
Specifically, Ms. Johnson testified that either she or Mr. Couch 
spoke to: 
a. Dave Noker, petitioner's employer who testified at 
trial; 
b. Brian Singer, a bartender who testified at trial; 
c. Gary Freer, petitioner's friend who testified at 
trial; 
d. Judy Aldous, petitioner's former girlfriend who 
testified at trial; 
e. All of petitioner's neighbors who were interviewed 
by the police; 
f. Debbie Corises, a friend of the victim, Marsha 
Haverty; 
g* Teresa Hilfiker, petitioner's ex-wife; 
h. Doris Childs, petitionees friend; and 
000 
i. Elaine Densley, a friend of the victim, Marsha 
Haverty. 
12. Petitioner testified that he wanted Ms. Johnson to call 
as witnesses: Teresa Hilfiker, Doris Childs, and Dr. Craig Hyatt 
(Ms. Haverty's son's psychologist). 
13. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Doris Childs 
testified that she dated petitioner for approximately six months 
from November 1986 until April 1987. Ms. Childs testified that 
during their relationship, petitioner never physically abused her 
or used physical force. Ms. Childs acknowledged that she was not 
aware that petitioner was charged in 1991 with a domestic violence 
assault and that as of 1992, she had no current knowledge regarding 
petitioner's propensity for violence; Ms. Childs' knowledge of 
petitioner's character was based on her six-month relationship with 
petitioner in 1986-87. 
14. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing Teresa 
Hilfiker, petitioner's ex-wife, testified that she was married to 
petitioner from 1984-1987. Ms. Hilfiker testified that during 
their marriage, petitioner never assaulted or physically abused Aar. OCA 
Ms. Hilfiker acknowledged that she was not aware that petitioner 
6 
was charged in 1991 with a domestic violence assault and that as of 
1992, she had no current knowledge regarding petitioner's 
propensity for violence. 
15. Petitioner was also represented by Leshia Lee-Dixon, who, 
entered her appearance as co-counsel on October 8, 1992. Ms. Lee-
Dixon's role in this case was limited primarily to opening 
statement, cross-examination of some police witnesses, preparing 
Dr. Finkle# and legal research. Petitioner has not challenged Ms. 
Lee-Dixon's effectiveness. 
16. Petitioner confessed to the police that he stabbed Marsha 
Haverty and subsequently poured kerosene over her and set her on 
fire. In addition to petitioner's confession, there was a 
significant amount of blood evidence which incriminated petitioner. 
17. Ms. Johnson filed a motion to suppress petitioner's 
confession. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the 
confession but granted Ms. Johnsons' motion to suppress 
petitioner's prior convictions1. 
Petitioner was convicted of burglary in 1978, aggravated 
burglary in 1979, and attempted theft in 1982. Additionally, 
petitioner was charged in 1990 with soliciting sex and in 1991 with 
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18. In light of the evidence against petitioner, Ms, Johnson 
determined that the only cound trial strategy was to convince the 
jury that petitioner was guilty only of lesser included offenses 
because he lacked the requisite mental state for the first degree 
felonies. In Ms, Johnson's professional opinion, petitioner's 
confession severely limited available defense theories and 
convinced her to pursue a manslaughter conviction based upon 
petitioner's cocaine and alcohol consumption. 
19. The jury was instructed on the following lesser included 
offenses: manslaughter, tampering with evidence, and 
abuse/desecration of a dead human body. Additionally, the jury was 
instructed that voluntary intoxication is a defense if it negates 
the mental state required to commit the offense(s). 
20. In preparing her trial theory, Ms. Johnson asked 
petitioner to write down any details of the crime that he 
remembered. Petitioner indicated to Ms. Johnson that he had been 
drinking and ingesting cocaine on the night of the murder and that 
a domestic violence assault. The disposition for these charges is 
unlisted. 
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he did not recall actually stabbing Ms. Haverty, but remembered 
pulling the knife out of her body and subsequently lighting her 
body on fire. Petitioner also indicated to Ms. Johnson that he 
remembered leaving the house after starting the fire and returning 
a short time afterward. 
21. Ms. Johnson discussed with petitioner the trial strategy 
and petitioner indicated to Ms. Johnson that he was in total 
agreement with the defense theory. 
22. Ms. Johnson called the following defense witnesses in 
support of the trial theory: 
a. Dr. Bryan Finkle, a well-recognized and respected 
toxicologist, who testified that cocaine and alcohol affect 
different parts of the brain, and that taking both substances at 
the same time is like driving with one foot on the gas pedal and 
one foot on the brake pedal at the same time. 
b. Dr. Linda Gummow, a psychologist who had met with 
petitioner on two occasions for two-and-a-half hours each session 
and had reviewed the autopsy reports# blood reports, police 
statements, and legal statutes. Dr. Gummow testified that if 
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petitioner had been intoxicated from alcohol and cocaine, it would 
not have been unusual for him to forget specific details of the 
crime. Dr. Gummow also testified that although petitioner did not 
meet the legal definition of mentally ill, petitioner could not 
have formed the intent tp kill Ms. Haverty. Dr. Gummow testified 
that petitioner acted recklessly due to the cocaine and alcohol 
use, combined with his emotional disturbance. 
c. Brian Singer, a bartender who testified about the 
number of drinks petitioner had at Charlies' Bar on the night of 
the murder. 
&. Gary Frear, a mam who used to shoot darts with 
petitioner at Charlies', testified that he saw petitioner at the 
bar around 6:00 or 6:30 the evening of the murder. Mr. Frear 
testified that petitioner had approximately five drinks and snorted 
a white powdery substance on three different occasions outside in 
the bar parking lot (approximately 9:30 p.m., 11:00 p.m., and 12:30 
a.m.) on the night of the murder. Mr. Frear further testified that 
petitioner left Charlies' at approximately 1:30 a.m. and that 
petitioner still had some white powdery substance in his bag. 
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e. David Noker, the manager at Ute Cab Company, and 
petitioner's former boss. Mr. Noker testified that petitioner 
liked to drink quite a bit and that on the Tuesday prior to the 
murder, petitioner seemed distraught and attempted after work to 
discuss (with Mr. Noker) his emotional problems. 
f. Judy Aldous, petitioner's former girlfriend, 
testified that she dated petitioner off and on for six years and 
that petitioner drank to excess too often and used cocaine when he 
drank. Ms. Aldous also testified that on one occasion, petitioner 
physically abused her, however it was petitioner who called the 
police and stated that he needed help. 
23. Ms. Johnson discussed many times with petitioner, the 
option of petitioner testifying on his own behalf. In fact, Ms. 
Johnson prepared petitioner to testify. However, after the defense 
witnesses had testified, Ms. Johnson told petitioner that all of 
the necessary evidence had come in through other witnesses and that 
in her professional opinion, petitioner's testimony was not needed, 
and that petitioner could in fact hurt his case by testifying. 
11 
00007 i 
24. If either petitioner or other character witnesses had 
testified regarding petitioner's peacefulness or lack of violence, 
petitioner would have opened the door for the prosecutor to attempt 
to impeach petitioner with petitioner's prior convictions and bad 
acts. Petitioner would have been prejudiced if the jury had heard 
about petitioner's prior acts of violence. 
25. Petitioner's case was thoroughly presented through the 
numerous defense witnesses, which included two experts who 
bolstered petitioner's defense theory. It was appropriate for Ms. 
Johnson to advise petitioner not to take the stand since all the 
necessary evidence had already been admitted. 
26. Petitioner made the ultimate decision, after receiving 
Ms. Johnson's professional opinion, to refrain from testifying on 
his own behalf. Ms. Johnson did not prevent petitioner fronv 
testifying. 
27. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Ms. Childs 
and Ms. Hilfiker testified that during his closing argument, the 
prosecutor, Greg Bown, repeatedly stabbed a styrofoam head and that 
the jury appeared to be shocked. 
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28 • Neither Ms. Johnson nor Mr. Bown recalled the use of the 
styrofoam head during closing argument. Ms. Johnson testified that 
she did not see anything objectionable about Mr. Bown's closing 
argument and would have objected to anything prejudicial. 
29. If Mr. Bown's closing argument had been exaggerated or 
prejudicial, the court would have interceded. Mr. Bown's closing 
argument was within reasonable bounds. 
30. Ms. Johnson's representation of petitioner was very 
thorough and professional and within the wide range of reasonably 
competent assistance. 
31. Petitioner does not have a constitutional right to be 
informed of all the possible ramifications of going to trial. 
Nevertheless, petitioner failed to demonstrate that had Ms. Johnson 
advised him differently, he would have insisted upon accepting the 
plea agreement. 
32. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that had Ms. Johnson 
called certain character witnesses at trial, or cross-examined the 
State's witnesses differently, or objected to Mr. Bown's closing 
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argument, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would 
have been different. 
33. Since Ms. Johnson effectively represented petitioner at 
trial, petitioner's appellate counsel, Joan Watt, was not 
ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal, the issue of Ms. 
Johnson's ineffectiveness. 
CONCLUSIONS OF M W 
1* Petitioner has the burden of satisfying, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the standard of ineffective 
assistance of counsel announced in Strickland v. Washington. 466 
U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Therefore, petitioner must demonstrate both 
that: specific acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance; and counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. 





Base on the foregoing, the Court now ORDERS as follows: 
1. The relief requested in the petition is denied. 
2. The petition is dismissed on the merits with prejudice. 
DATED this ? —a~ay of CLL^AO^ . 1995. 
JLE KENNE*p! RItSTRUP1 
Third District Court 
Approved as to form: 
AJA*\ ( * lA'TWA* d &Asaar__fcl3S' 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Attorney for petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this i^r day of July, 1995 to: 
Dean C. Andreasen 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for petitioner 
201 S. Main St., Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee 
P.O. Box 140854 
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
ORIGINAL F I L E D 
APR 1 2 1996 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY D. HILFIKER, JR., 
Petitioner/Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
RECORD 
Case No. 950486 
Pursuant to appellee's motion and good cause appearing, the Court 
ORDERS the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, to supplement the 
record in Gary P. Hilfiker. Jr. v. State of Utah. 940903984 HC, with the record in State of 
Utah v. Gary P. Hilfiker. Jr.. 921900991. The clerk is directed not to re-paginate the record 
in case number 921900991, but should reference case number 921900991 as a single 
volume supplement to the record in case number 940903984 HC. 
DATED this day of April, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
